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metaphysical foundations of idealism. Exclusive idealism must be supplemented by a healthy realism. Wundt says, that philosophy must take as its foundation the whole range of scientific experience; then it will be the science of sciences in the true sense of the word. Science has uncontestedly the ruling interest of the day; and with reason, because of the exactness of its method and the certainty of its results. But science at its zenith ends with unsolved problems. These limits are in the words of Du Bois-Reymond: (1) inertia, matter and force; (2) the inconceivability of a passage from the mental to the material; (3) the origin of motion; (4) the genesis of life; (5) the arrangement of the world according to a purpose; (6) the origin of rational thought, and of language; and (7) the problem of free will. And Haeckel rightly says, that these phenomena are not fully explained by heredity and selection. This lies in the fact that our knowing faculty is absolutely limited and has only a relative extension. It is conditioned above all, by the nature of our sense-organs and brain. Bunge in his treatise on physiological and pathological chemistry also says, that the mechanism of the present brings us with certainty to the vitalism of the future, but that the essence of this vitalism consists in a going out from the known, the inner world, to explain the unknown, the outer world. The above ideas are an acknowledgement from the side of science itself, that its continuation and completion must be found in philosophy. Science without philosophy ends in unsolved problems; philosophy without science lacks a sure foundation. Both are children of the same mother; both work for the solution of the same secrets. But in what philosophy shall science find its continuation and consummation? It is the very nature of science to rest on experience; and this philosophy therefore must be based on facts; in a word, purely empirical. With such a philosophy only, can science go hand in hand. Such a philosophy, the author says is set forth in this work. The foundation of ethics (treated of in the second volume) must come from the results of science and philosophy; the proof of truth must be derived from metaphysics (*sit venia verbo*). The moral act expresses the deepest nature of humanity, and is inseparably connected with the sense-phenomenal and psycho-metaphysical nature of man. Morality cosmologically considered brings to light the essence of man; and thus the investigation of moral problems leads to the study of anthropology, cosmology, psychology and metaphysics. In order that the whole may have a logical connection and a systematic unity, the author investigates in like manner the object as the methodological problem, the transcendental problem and the epistemological. He then considers the analysis of the Microcosmus, that is, of the individual man according to his physical and mental content, as expressed in the conscious *ego*. This is followed by an analysis of the Macrocosmus, both of the organic and inorganic part. Since here is shown how the being and functioning of the objective world is imaged again in scientific consciousness, this part also can be designated as a microcosmus in subjective relation with the first part as a microcosmus in objective relation. A unified system of philosophy with the name of "empirical psychical realism" will be, as Haeckel says, the philosophy of the future; and is nothing further than a complete system of monism.

Les lois de l'imitation; Étude sociologique, par G. TARDE. Paris, 1890. pp. 431.

In this work the author has endeavored with as much clearness as possible to bring out the purely social side of humanity; abstracting that which is simply vital or physical. But he finds, that the point of view, in favor of which he could mark this difference, shows between the social and natural phenomena the most numerous, constant and natural analogies. This pure sociology is general; its laws are applicable to all actual, past or possible societies, just as physiological laws

are to all species. The philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature, as generally understood, present the historical and natural phenomena in such a way as to preclude the possibility of a wholly different grouping or succession.

The real is only explicable by being attached to the immensity of the possible, that is to say, of the necessary under conditions, where it swims as a star in infinite space. The idea of law is the conception of this firmament of facts. Certainly all is rigorously determined, and the reality could not be different, its primordial and unknown conditions being given. But why these, and not others? There is irrationality at the basis of necessity. Also in the physical and living domain, as in the social world, that which is realized, seems to be only a fragment of that which can be realized. The mind does not admit the relation of cause to effect, except where the effect resembles the cause, repeats the cause; as an undulation gives rise to another similar undulation. Each time that "produce" does not signify to "reproduce," all becomes dark to us. There is only science of similitudes and phenomenal repetitions. (1) All the similitudes in the chemical, physical and astronomical world have for their explanation and possible cause periodic and vibratory movements. (2) All similitudes in the vital world result from hereditary transmission, from intra or extra-organic generation. (3) All the similitudes of social origin are the direct or indirect fruit of imitation in all its forms: custom, sympathy, obedience, instruction, education, social imitation or reflective imitation. In short, every social similitude has imitation as its cause.

A social group may be defined, as a collection of beings in so far as they are imitated among themselves, or, without actual imitation, in so far as they resemble one another, and their common traits are ancient copies of the same model. Society is essentially imitation. The brain is an organ which repeats sensitive centers, and is itself composed of elements that repeat themselves. Memory is purely a nervous habit; habit is a muscular memory. Thus every act of perception supposes a sort of habit, an unconscious imitation of one's self by one's self. Society is a memory, a habit not individual, but collective. What is the nature of this imitation, of this suggestion that constitutes the mental life? We do not know. For if we consider this fact in its purity we are brought to a phenomenon, much studied at present: somnambulism. If one will read the books of Richet, Binet et Féré, Beaunis, Bernheim and Delboeuf, he will be convinced that it is no fancy to regard social man as a veritable somnambule. The social state, like the hypnotic, is only a form of dream. Sympathy is mutual imitation, mutual prestige, according to Adam Smith; prestige is at the base and origin of society.

From archeological and statistical considerations, history may be defined, as a collection of things that have been done most; that is to say, initiatives that have been imitated most. History is the destiny of imitations.

Considered logically or teleologically, (1) internal models will be imitated before external, and (2) examples of persons, or classes, or localities considered superior will take precedence over the inferior, and (3) superiority is sometimes attached to the present, sometimes the past, and is a powerful cause of favor, of a considerable historical influence, as examples of our fathers or of those of our contemporaries.

This imitation from the within to the without signifies two things: (1) That imitation of ideas precedes that of expression, (2) that imitation of purpose precedes that of means.

The classes or nations which are imitated most are those in which imitation is the most reciprocal. A large city is characterized by an intensity of internal imitation in proportion to the density of population and the multiform multiplicity of the relations of its inhabitants. Thus

there is an epidemic and contagious character given not only to its diseases, but to its styles and its views. Aristocratic classes were once remarkable for an analogous character, and to an eminent degree the royal courts.

After considering, from the point of view of imitation, language, religion, government, legislation, usages and needs, morals and arts, the author finishes his work with some general remarks and corollaries:

The supreme law of imitation appears to be its own tendency to an indefinite progression. This sort of immanent ambition, which is the soul of the universe, and which is transformed physically by the luminous conquest of space, vitally by the claim of each species to fill the entire globe with its examples, seems to push each discovery or each invention (even the most insignificant individual innovation) to scatter itself indefinitely in the whole social field. But this tendency, when not seconded by logically and teleologically auxiliary inventions, or by the favor of certain prestiges, is hindered by diverse objects. These obstacles are either logical and teleological contradictions, or barriers which a thousand causes, principally prejudices and pride of race, have established between families, tribes and peoples. It results from this that a good idea, arising in one of these groups is propagated without trouble, until it reaches the frontiers. But fortunately this arrest is only slackening of pace. War is often more a civilizer for the conquered than for the conqueror, for the former often borrows its ideas from the latter. Each germ of imitation in the brain of the imitator, under the form of a belief, aspiration or idea, develops into exterior manifestations, into words, actions, which are impressed upon the nervous and muscular systems according to the law of march from within to without. Each act of imitation makes each new act more free and rational, more precise and rigorous. These conditions are the gradual suppression of barriers of caste, class and nationality; the gradual diminution of distances by the rapidity of locomotion and the density of population. Suppose all these conditions reunited and pushed to the highest degree, the imitative transmission of a good initiative over all humanity would be almost instantaneous, like the propagation of a wave in a perfectly elastic medium. We are hastening to this strange ideal, and already we meet indications in the world of savants, where although far separated, they touch each instant by mutiple international communications.

Psychopathologie des Bewusstseins für Aerzte und Juristen, von Dr. F. C. MÜLLER. Leipzig, 1889. pp. 190.

The author considers first the nature of consciousness itself, taking up the different theories of the concept "consciousness" from the medical, legal and philosophical standpoint. He then studies the conditions in which consciousness experiences a derangement, or is abolished; and concludes with a short résumé of the different opinions as held by physician and judge in respect to these exceptional conditions of the *psyche*. Consciousness is a function of our mental life and communicates with the outward world through the organs of sense. Its elements are the representations that it changes into concepts. Its location is in the brain; it can perceive and reproduce; it is the relation of a single changing cerebral act to the whole content of the brain. The highest grade of consciousness is self-consciousness; then come personal consciousness, time and space-consciousness, and world consciousness. In pathological cases, the result of the unconscious cerebral mechanics penetrates to consciousness, then it is in general unconsciousness; or it is grasped indirectly by self-consciousness, then it manifests itself as hallucination or as executed impulsive action. Finally the functions of consciousness, to wit, attention, reflection, artistic reproduction can be wholly nullified as in fever delirium, epilepsy, alcohol-intoxication and